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Intergenerational Wealth Mobility in Rural Bangladesh
* 
 
Unique residential history data with retrospective information on parental assets are used to 
study household wealth mobility in 141 villages in rural Bangladesh. Regression estimates of 
father-son correlations and analyses of intergenerational transition matrices show substantial 
persistence in wealth even when we correct for measurement errors in parental wealth. We 
do not find wealth mobility to be higher between periods of a person’s life than between 
generations. We find that the process of household division plays an important role: sons 
who splinter off from the father’s household experience greater (albeit downward) mobility in 
wealth. Despite significant occupational mobility across generations, its contribution to wealth 
mobility, net of human capital attainment of individuals, appears insignificant. Low wealth 




JEL Classification:  D63, O53 
  
Keywords:  intergenerational inequality, household wealth, occupational mobility,  





M. Niaz Asadullah 
School of Economics 
University of Reading 
PO Box 218 
Whiteknights 
Reading, RG6 6AA 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: m.asadullah@reading.ac.uk  
 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Professor Stefan Dercon for valuable comments and suggestions. I am also grateful 
to ICDDR,B for granting me access to Demographic Surveillance System (DSS) data on Matlab thana 
used in the paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at Oxford University (CSAE), 
Reading University, the Open University (UK), Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) 
and PEGNet workshop on “Poverty reduction, equity, and growth: New issues and findings” at The Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy (April 2006) and the Royal Economic Society Conference (2006, 
University of Nottingham). The usual disclaimers apply. 2 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Prevalence  of  income  poverty  is  a  hallmark  of  countries  at  the  bottom  of  the 
development discourse. A significant part of the observed income inequality often 
reflects  persistent  differences  in  the  capacity  of  individuals  to  exploit  market 
opportunities. Economic immobility – persistence in economic status - then reflects 
inequality  of  opportunities  and  therefore  the  process  that  underlies  persistence  in 
income poverty. As such, two countries with an identical distribution of income in a 
given year can offer a very different set of economic opportunities to their populations 
and consequently differ in their capability to minimize income inequality over time 
and  across  generations.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  growth  in  income  and  its 
distribution, knowledge of the extent of relative social mobility is useful in that it 
provides  information  about  the  long-run  distribution  of  outcomes  and  the  factors 
underlying them. 
  Despite the policy relevance of research on economic mobility, relatively less 
is known on the issue for developing countries. A handful of studies nevertheless exist 
on intra-generational (i.e. inter-temporal) mobility in rural economies of Asia using 
household level panel data. For example, Swaminathan (1991) uses such data from a 
South  Indian village for the  years 1977 and 1985 to  examine mobility in  wealth. 
Similarly, Fuwa (1999) uses data from the Philippines to study occupational mobility. 
In a much-publicised study of a north Indian village, Drèze et al. (1998) examine 
income mobility over five decades. However, study on persistence in outcomes across 
generations of the same family is rare.  
  A  key  reason  for  the  absence  of  research  on  intergenerational  mobility  in 
developing countries is a lack of panel data or cross-section data with information on 
parents. Recently a number of studies have exploited the latter to study persistence in 3 
 
economic  outcomes  across  generations.  A  recent  and  comprehensive  study  is  by 
Grawe (2004) who studies father-son earnings data from the US, the UK, Pakistan, 
Peru, Nepal, Malaysia and Ecuador. Grawe reports substantial earnings immobility in 
developing  countries
1. Most importantly, when compared to developed countries, 
mobility is found to be less in developing societies.  
This  paper  provides  a  microeconometric  analysis  of  Bangladesh’s 
intergenerational  wealth  mobility,  for  141  villages,  focusing  on  male  headed 
households  across  time  and  generations.  The  aim  of  the  paper  is  to  investigate 
mobility, through a detailed description of the dynamics of socio economic mobility 
in  a  developing  country.  More  specifically,  it  aims  to  investigate  changes  in  the 
relative economic and social positions of individuals in rural Bangladesh, over three 
decades. The analysis is based on cross-sectional data with retrospective records on 
parental/household characteristics and asset portfolio. 
Our  analysis  suggests  limited  intergenerational  wealth  mobility  in  rural 
Bangladesh. This is true even when we correct for measurement errors in parental 
wealth and endogeneity of number of correlates of son’s wealth namely, son’s family 
size  and  whether  the  son’s  household  is  a  split-off.  Regression  analysis  of 
intergenerational wealth data yields an estimate of father-son correlation in the range 
of  0.53  and  0.77.    Intergenerational  persistence  is  also  very  high  in  educational 
attainment. Examination of various potential economic and demographic correlates of 
son’s wealth shows that education is the most important driver of wealth mobility in 
rural  Bangladesh.  A  comparison  of  father-son  schooling  correlations  for  different 
cohorts reveals that schooling mobility has not increased much in rural Bangladesh. 
This in turn explains the lack of wealth mobility in our data. Nonetheless, our results 
                                                 
1  Fields  (2000) discusses  additional  studies  that  use  panel  data  from  Peru  and  Malaysia  to  assess 
mobility in earnings in developing societies. 4 
 
should be interpreted with caution. The dataset used in this paper is based on multiple 
census rounds carried out in Matlab Thana and provide information on all adult sons 
who resided in the study area between 1974 and 1996. But any son who moved out of 
the  Matlab  area  from  the  father’s  generation  is  excluded.  Such  dwelling  based 
sampling implies that our study of economic mobility may suffer from bias to the 
extent spatial mobility and socio-economic mobility are linked
2.  
  The balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the study area – the 
Matlab villages - with reference to various aspects of the structural change that has 
transformed the Matlab area in the last three decades.  This helps in explaining the 
societal  context  in  which  we  study  mobility.  The  empirical  strategy  is  set  out  in 
section 3. It is then followed by a description of the data in section 4. Results are 
discussed in section 5 while section 6 concludes. 
2  Social and economic background of Matlab, 1974-1996 
The Matlab thana comprises of 141 villages and is located in Chandpur district, 55 
kilometres south-east of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. The economy of Matlab is 
primarily  agricultural,  with  the  majority  of  population  engaged  in  various  farm 
activities. Average travel time between the Matlab thana and Dhaka is five hours -- 
the  villages  remain  considerably  remote  chiefly  due  to  poor  transport  facilities. 
Villagers therefore significantly rely on the local economy for their daily livelihood 
(Razzaque and Streatfield, 2001). 
  The  period  of  1974-1996  has  seen  notable  socio-economic  changes  in 
Bangladesh which is also reflected in the data on the Matlab villages. By virtue of a 
comprehensive demographic surveillance system (DSS) maintained in the area since 
                                                 
2  Nonetheless, existing international evidence on endogenous attrition in panel studies is mixed. Using 
Indonesian household survey data, Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith (2001) find that attritors who 
move long distances differ statistically from those they leave behind. But in their tests on longitudinal 
household  data  from  Bolivia,  Kenya,  and  South  Africa,  Alderman  et  al.  (2001)  find  little  bias  in 
practice.  5 
 
1966  by  the  International  Centre  for  Diarrhoeal  Disease  Research,  Bangladesh 
(ICDDR,B), it is possible to track some of these changes. The extent of poverty and 
the exact changes in the standard of living over the years in the study area is difficult 
to ascertain in the absence of income/consumption data. Information on basic assets 
owned  by  the  households,  quality  of  housing,  access  to  safe  drinking  water,  and 
sanitation nevertheless exist in the DSS records. Three complete censuses conducted 
by ICDDR,B yield these data for the years 1974, 1982 and 1996. Substantial growth 
is observed in the ownership of productive assets and consumer durables in the region 
between 1974 and 1996. The precise mechanism underlying the changes in living 
conditions, as measured in terms of basic (non-land) indicators of household wealth, 
are not clear. “Gains” in living standard are apparently mirrored by a drop in illiteracy 
rate, a decline in fertility and changing occupational class structure. In 1974, only 
33% of the population in Matlab had some formal schooling.  A secular increase in 
school  participation  is  nevertheless  apparent  since  then  –  by  1996,  ever-schooled 
population increased to 60%.  
  The past two decades have also seen a steep decline in the fertility rate in 
Bangladesh. Noteworthy changes have also occurred in the sectoral composition of 
the labour force. The share of wage work (agricultural, non-agricultural and service 
related) declined from 35.7% in 1974 to 26.6% by 1996. This is primarily driven by a 
reduction in the share of the agricultural labour from 18% of the workforce in 1974 to 
5.1% by 1996.  The share of waged work in  non-farm sector also  increased  from 
17.7% to 21.5% in 1996.  
  The above changes have important implications for economic mobility in the 
Matlab villages. In this study, we do not exhaustively account for all the determinants 
of mobility. Neither are we able to test for causal effects of all the determinants. 6 
 
Instead,  we  attempt  to  describe  the  extent  and  nature  of  generational  mobility  in 
schooling and in turn examine how this relates to mobility in wealth. 
3  Empirical strategy 
Most of the existing empirical studies on intergenerational economic mobility employ 
the  model  of  regression  to  the  mean  to  relate  son’s  status  to  that  of  his  father. 
Therefore, we first estimate the following regression:  
Son’s wealtht= 0 + 1(Father’s wealth)t + t  (1)  
where t is a random error term. The regression framework focuses on mean mobility 
where 1 is the OLS estimate of the degree of generational persistence in wealth. 
However,  equation  (1)  does  not  say  anything  about  the  drivers  of  persistence  in 
wealth.  
For various reasons, one would expect an intergenerational link in economic 
status,  defined  in  terms  of  earnings  or  wealth.  Human  capital  (e.g.  schooling) 
investment in children combined with the model of intergenerational transmission of 
innate ability provides a framework to understand such a link (Grawe and Mulligan, 
2002). If higher education raises earnings and improves one’s wealth status, children 
of credit-constrained families, those usually with little parental wealth stay relatively 
poor as a consequence of low education. Wealthy parents may also have a higher taste 
for  education  and  raise  children’s  schooling  independent  of  credit  constraints. 
Persistence in wealth, therefore, mirrors persistence in schooling. Demography also 
plays an important role in the process of wealth transmission. A primary channel for 
acquisition of land – the most valuable productive asset in rural areas – is largely 
demographic and works through family division. For Indian data, Walker and Ryan 
(1990) find that 60% of households subdivided some land intergenerationally and 
95% of the multiple-heir households split and subdivided some land at inheritance. 7 
 
Altogether, this process of household partition accounts for most of the decline in 
average household landholding and consequently, a more important determinant of 
household  wealth  compared  to  household-specific  accumulation  (Foster  and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). This process, which leads to greater intergenerational persistence 
among sons  who directly  inherit a household  from  the patriarch, a priori predicts 
downward mobility for split-offs
3.  
  To account for the various determinants of mobility, we adopt a step -wise 
procedure and report additional regressions of son’s wealth incrementally controlling 
for the following covariates: age and age-squared, education, family size, inheritance 
of (household) headship and occupation. This then yields an alternative estimate of 
persistence, 1, from equation (2).  This strategy allows us to track changes in the 
coefficient  on  father’s  wealth  following  inclusion  of  each  of  the  additional 
determinants of son’s wealth: 
Son’s  wealtht=  0  +  1(Father’s  Wealth)t  +  2Aget  +    3Educationt  + 
4(Headship Inheritance)t + 5(Occupation)t + 6(Family size)t + t    (2) 
The OLS estimate of persistence is not robust to the possibility that father’s wealth 
could be measured with error so that estimate of persistence is smaller
4. Therefore, we 
also report instrumental variable (IV) estimates of wealth persistence where father’s 
wealth is instrumented by the father’s education and occupation
5.  
                                                 
3 However, the full effect of household formation and dissolution on mobility is unknown. There is a 
small literature that looks at welfare of individuals in split-offs vs. intact households (Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). The findings suggest limited welfare gains for the split-offs. 
4 There are very few studies on wealth persistence that tests for such a bias. However, the evidence of a 
downward bias is evident from the literature on earnings mobility. A series of revisionist studies (e.g. 
Solon, 1992) report a larger estimate of persistence in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 (compared to older 
estimates of 0.2), once measurement errors in earnings are accounted for (Solon, 2002).  
5 Charles and Hurst (2003) instrument father’s wealth by father’s education. Similar 2SLS framework 
is used in Dunn (2003). In earnings regressions for sons, Dunn instruments father’s earnings by father’s 
occupation. Nonetheless, the exogeneity of such instruments is not a priori conspicuous. For example, 
father’s  wealth  could  additionally  suffer  from  the  problem  of  endogeneity  if  unobserved  earnings 
endowment (such as innate ability) is contained in the error term in equation (2). 8 
 
  A problem also arises with the son’s family size, which is often co-determined 
with  his  wealth  and  hence  endogenous.  Wealthier  households,  particularly  those 
engaged in farm work, are likely to demand more children in particular if the labour 
market is imperfect. Thus, we additionally instrument family size by (i) the sex of first 
(eldest)  child  and  (ii)  whether  the  household  is  located  in  the  treatment  area
6. 
Individuals  in  the  treatment  villages  had  access  to  specialized  family  planning 
services offered by the ICDDR,B.  Since villages were randomly chosen for this 
intervention,  location  in  the  treatment  area  is  a  priori  ex ogenous  to  household 
characteristics. Availability of multiple instruments means that our IV models are 
always over-identified. We therefore carry out conventional tests for the validity of 
our instruments.  
  A key feature of our data is that we are able t o determine whether a son’s 
household  is  a  split-off  or  directly  inherited  from  his  father.  This  allows  us  to 
investigate another potential cause of mobility in rural areas i.e. household partition. 
Once again, household division could be driven by resource scarcity or a lack of 
surplus in one’s household of origin (i.e. father’s household). If father’s wealth is 
measured with errors, exogeneity of household inheritance status would be of suspect: 
inheritance status (for sons) could partly capture the effect of unaccounted paternal 
wealth. We test for this possibility by additionally instrumenting son’s inheritance of 
headship. As excluded instruments,  we use two retrospective measures  of “within 
household  inequality”:  birth  order  of  the  son  and  difference  in  the  educational 
attainments among his siblings. Within household inequalities in human capital (and 
age) implies that there is a reduced benefit of joint residence and consequently, an 
                                                 
6See Angrist and Evans (1998) for an application of similar instruments based on family composition.  9 
 
increased  probability  of  household  partition  (Foster  and  Rosenzweig,  2001; 
Rosenzweig, 2003). 
  It should be noted that regression estimates of father-son correlations do not 
measure  mobility  as  a  positional  change  in  one’s  wealth  distribution.  In  certain 
circumstances, instead of mean or level persistence, one may be interested in the rank 
mobility.  The  transition  matrix  approach  is  superior  in  this  respect.  In  an 
intergenerational  context,  the  matrix  yields  the  probability  of  sons  reaching  a 
particular status for a given status of their fathers. The technique works by converting 
continuous status variables for fathers and sons into discrete ordered variables having 
same  number  of  ordered  categories.  Members  of  each  generations/periods  are 
classified  according  to  fixed  categories  such  as  equal-sized  quantiles,  with  base-
period quantile determining the row and destination-period quantile the column. The 
joint distribution is then parameterized by a (n x n) matrix M containing the transition 
probabilities. If economic status persists fully across generations/periods, M would be 
an identity matrix with all entries lying on the diagonal axis.  
  A problem with the transition matrix analysis is that it is compounded by life-
cycle effects. To this end, we use age-adjusted data instead, using residuals from a 
regression  of  wealth  on  individual’s  age  and  age-squared.  In  addition,  we  report 
additional transition matrices using residuals from regressions of son’s wealth on the 
following sets of covariates:  (i) age, age-squared, and education (ii) age, age-squared, 
education  and  family  size  and,  (iii)  age,  age-squared,  education,  family  size  and 
occupation respectively
7. A comparative analysis of these transition matrices provides 
a crude way to understand the factors that cause father-son mobility in the data.  
                                                 
7  To  guard  against  possible  outliers,  we  also  repeat  the  analysis  using  residuals  from  median 
regressions. 10 
 
  Given that the transition matrix approach is purely descriptive, it’s difficult to 
compare mobility between two samples without some overall summary statistics or 
scalar measures. Therefore, for each transition matrix, M, we compute statistics which 
give a measure of mobility in terms of time dependence. These are Pearson’s chi-
square  and  likelihood-ratio  chi-square  statistics.  These  statistics  compare  expected 
frequencies (when there is perfect mobility) with observed frequencies and therefore 
assume larger values the further we are from the state of perfect mobility. For the sake 
of brevity, however, we only report likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic. 
  The above two indices, while useful for ranking transition matrices, do not say 
anything  about  positional  movements:  An  individual  is  said  to  have  experienced 
mobility if she changes position in the status distribution. Hence, for each transition 
matrix, we also construct an additional total of five indices of mobility: Shorrocks’ 
MET (also known as the Prais index), Atkinson  et al. mobility ratio, determinant 
index, average jump and normalised average jump.  
  These five mobility indices can be classified as (a) individual cell-related and 
(b)  aggregate  measures  (Swaminathan,  1991).  Both  average  absolute  jump  and 
normalised average jump are of the first type. The rest - Prais index, Atkinson et al. 
mobility ratio and the determinant index - are aggregate measures of mobility. The 
Prais index is defined as: [n - trace of M]/[n-1] where, M is the transition matrix and 
n is the number of rows/columns. Atkinson (im)mobility ratio focuses on the fraction 
of cases lying along the principal diagonal and the adjacent cells. By focusing on the 
diagonal  elements,  these  two  measures  provide  a  way  to  quantify  the  extent  of 
immobility
8. They vary with (i) number of quantiles and (ii) distance between initial 
and base year. The longer the time period, the smaller is the immobility ratio. The 
                                                 
8  However,  measures  of  mobility  with  a  focus  on  proximity  to  diagonal  axis  it  not  wholly 
unproblematic. For example, significance of a jump of one quintile depends on the location in the 
distribution - end quintiles are limited in their movements (Atkinson et al., 1992). 11 
 
determinant index is defined as 1 - |M|
1/[n-1] . Both the Prais index and the determinant 
index are bounded between 0 and 1: if there is perfect mobility, these two indices 
converge to unity. 
  The above three aggregate indices give no indication of how many quantiles a 
mover moves. In this respect, the cell-related indices -- mean absolute and normalized 
jump  --  are superior:  they provide a measure of the number of quantiles  that the 
typical member of a class would jump between two periods. For example, “average 
absolute jump” calculates the mean number of quantiles moved in absolute value. 
Like the previous indicators of mobility, these two indices are also sensitive to the 
choice of the range over which movement is measured i.e. quintiles, ventiles and so 
on (Fields, 2000). 
  Lastly, while we estimate all six indices, for the sake of brevity, only four are 
used throughout the paper. These are: correlation coefficient, Prais index, Atkinson et 
al. mobility ratio and average jump index. This omission (of two indices) has no 
implication for our analysis as all the six mobility indicators were found to yield a 
nearly consistent ranking of the transition matrices for our data. 
4  Data  
The  data  used  in  this  study  comes  from  the  ICDDR,B  which  has  maintained  a 
demographic surveillance system (DSS) in the Matlab thana since 1966. We use a 
random sample of 12015 male-headed households extracted from the database on the 
Matlab Socioeconomic Census (MSEC) 1996, a complete census of the study villages 
carried out by the ICDDR,B. These households belonged to 2687 baris
9 in the Matlab 
thana. The MSEC 1996 sample data does not automat ically yield past records on 
parental  characteristics  (such  as  age  and  education)  and  outcomes  (such  as 
                                                 
9 Baris usually consist of a cluster of households in close physical proximity linked in many instances 
in a kin-network. In 1996, there were a total of 7440 baris in the Matlab thana. 12 
 
occupations and asset portfolio). We retrospectively extracted this from earlier rounds 
of  the  MSEC.  For  a  total  of  10430  male-headed  households  in  the  MSEC  1996 
sample we were able to extract complete parental and past socio-economic records 
implying an attrition rate of 13.2%.  
    For  our  empirical  analysis,  we  use  this  dataset  to  construct  two 
analytical samples. The first sample consists of male heads  whose fathers were also 
present in the study area as a household head in 1974. This contains 5044 sons (47% 
of whom head split-off households) for whom we have complete contemporaneous 
data on their households and retrospective information on their parents and household 
of origin in childhood. We use this sample to study intergenerational mobility. The 
second sample has repeated data on adult sons. This comprises of 4048 male heads of 
households in 1996 who remained heads in earlier census rounds (i.e. in 1974 and 
1982) in Matlab area. We use this sample to examine inter-temporal mobility. The 
Appendix describes the construction of the working sample in detail. 
  Lastly, Matlab censuses did not contain data on value of the household assets. 
Therefore, we constructed an aggregate measure of household wealth by combining 
data on ownership of various assets, quality of dwelling, usage and sources of water. 
The  Appendix  includes  a  detailed  note  explaining  the  method  used  to  create  the 
wealth index.  
5  Results and discussion 
5.1  Intergenerational wealth mobility 
Transition matrix analysis 
  Table  1  reports  the  wealth  (quintile)  transition  matrices  for  the  sample  of 
father-son pairs. Sons are represented in the columns against fathers’ rows. For each 
son,  the  matrices  give  us  the  probability  of  being  in  a  certain  wealth  quintile 13 
 
conditional on father’s position in his wealth distribution. Hence, the row probabilities 
add up to  1. On the basis of the raw data, movement  appears to  be restricted to 
individuals who are initially better-off (in terms of parental position). The chi-square 
test statistics have large values (all significant at 1% level) indicating substantial time-
dependence. However, without correction for age of the individuals, these matrices 
are  confounded  by  life-cycle  effects
10.  Indeed  the  age -adjusted  transition  matrix 
exhibits greater mobility compared to that for the raw data. Substantial persistence 
remains nevertheless, particularly at the two ends of the wealth distribution. The 
probability that sons of the poorest stay poor is 0.34. Likewise, sons of the richest 
fathers stay richest in 36% cases. In general, immobility is much higher in the highest 
and the lowest wealth quintiles than in the middle. 
  In Table 1, we additionally compute three transiti on matrices using residuals 
from the OLS regressions with control for key determinants of son’s wealth. To be 
precise,  we  incrementally  adjust  son’s  wealth  data  for  his  educational  attainment, 
occupation and household size. Comparison of the age-adjusted transition matrix to 
these latter matrices provides a crude way to understand how persistence in education 
and occupation and shocks to fertility over time may have affected mobility in wealth. 
For example, convergence of (transition) cell probabilities to the neighbourhood of 
0.20  with  an  additional  control  for,  say,  education,  would  suggest  that  lower 
educational mobility is associated with immobility in raw/age-adjusted wealth data. 
                                                 
10 Given that data on fathers and sons are from 1974 and 1996 respectively, this problem is somewhat 
less serious in our data. 14 
 
Table 1: Father-son wealth transition matrices 
 
    Raw wealth data    Age-adjusted wealth data   
Age & education adjusted  
wealth data   
Age, education & family size  
adjusted  wealth data   
Age, education, family size & 
occupation adjusted  wealth data 
      Son            Son            Son            Son            Son       
[Full sample]    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5 
  1  0.42  0.29  0.18  0.09  0.01  1  0.36  0.27  0.21  0.11  0.04  1  0.31  0.29  0.21  0.11  0.09  1  0.31  0.28  0.21  0.11  0.09  1  0.29  0.29  0.20  0.12  0.10 
  2  0.28  0.26  0.24  0.15  0.07  2  0.28  0.25  0.2  0.14  0.13  2  0.25  0.25  0.20  0.15  0.16  2  0.25  0.25  0.20  0.15  0.16  2  0.24  0.25  0.20  0.14  0.17 
Father  3  0.18  0.23  0.23  0.25  0.11  3  0.20  0.25  0.21  0.18  0.16  3  0.21  0.24  0.19  0.18  0.18  3  0.21  0.24  0.19  0.18  0.18  3  0.22  0.24  0.19  0.17  0.19 
  4  0.10  0.15  0.21  0.35  0.19  4  0.12  0.14  0.22  0.25  0.27  4  0.14  0.14  0.19  0.24  0.29  4  0.14  0.14  0.19  0.24  0.29  4  0.15  0.14  0.21  0.23  0.27 
  5  0.04  0.08  0.15  0.39  0.35  5  0.06  0.08  0.15  0.32  0.39  5  0.09  0.09  0.20  0.33  0.29  5  0.09  0.09  0.20  0.33  0.29  5  0.10  0.08  0.20  0.34  0.28 
Pearson’s 2            1353            970            573            569            537 
Likelihood 2            1429            1026            598            594            560 
[Inherited]    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5 
  1  0.38  0.29  0.19  0.13  0.02  1  0.39  0.23  0.20  0.13  0.06  1  0.32  0.26  0.18  0.12  0.11  1  0.33  0.26  0.17  0.13  0.11  1  0.31  0.26  0.17  0.13  0.13 
  2  0.25  0.26  0.22  0.18  0.10  2  0.29  0.22  0.17  0.16  0.16  2  0.26  0.21  0.19  0.17  0.19  2  0.25  0.21  0.18  0.17  0.19  2  0.24  0.22  0.19  0.15  0.19 
Father  3  0.14  0.19  0.24  0.27  0.15  3  0.18  0.23  0.20  0.21  0.18  3  0.21  0.20  0.19  0.19  0.21  3  0.21  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.21  3  0.20  0.20  0.18  0.18  0.23 
  4  0.07  0.10  0.18  0.40  0.24  4  0.11  0.10  0.22  0.27  0.3  4  0.14  0.11  0.17  0.24  0.33  4  0.14  0.11  0.18  0.24  0.33  4  0.15  0.11  0.19  0.27  0.29 
  5  0.03  0.04  0.11  0.41  0.40  5  0.05  0.05  0.11  0.34  0.45  5  0.07  0.06  0.19  0.38  0.30  5  0.07  0.06  0.19  0.38  0.31  5  0.08  0.05  0.22  0.37  0.29 
Pearson’s 2            768            585            352            347            325 
Likelihood 2            824            618            369            363            345 
[Split-offs]    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5 
  1  0.46  0.30  0.17  0.06  0.01  1  0.33  0.33  0.23  0.09  0.02  1  0.28  0.31  0.25  0.10  0.06  1  0.28  0.31  0.25  0.10  0.06  1  0.27  0.33  0.23  0.11  0.06 
  2  0.31  0.26  0.26  0.12  0.05  2  0.27  0.28  0.23  0.11  0.11  2  0.24  0.29  0.22  0.13  0.13  2  0.24  0.29  0.22  0.13  0.13  2  0.24  0.28  0.20  0.13  0.14 
Father  3  0.22  0.26  0.23  0.22  0.06  3  0.22  0.28  0.23  0.14  0.13  3  0.21  0.28  0.20  0.16  0.14  3  0.21  0.28  0.20  0.16  0.14  3  0.23  0.27  0.20  0.15  0.15 
  4  0.14  0.21  0.25  0.28  0.13  4  0.12  0.18  0.23  0.23  0.23  4  0.14  0.18  0.21  0.23  0.24  4  0.14  0.17  0.21  0.23  0.24  4  0.15  0.18  0.24  0.20  0.24 
  5  0.05  0.11  0.20  0.36  0.28  5  0.07  0.11  0.20  0.30  0.32  5  0.12  0.13  0.21  0.27  0.28  5  0.12  0.13  0.21  0.27  0.28  5  0.13  0.12  0.18  0.30  0.27 
Pearson’s 2            602            399            236            238            235 
Likelihood 2            619            427            248            250            242 
Note: Underlying mobility indices are reported in Table 2. 15 
 
Indeed  a  large  number  of  the  cell  probabilities  converge  to  values  in  the 
neighbourhood of 0.20, particularly on and around the principal diagonal. The largest 
drop in cell probabilities, particularly at the extreme end of the wealth distribution, 
occurs when we adjust for son’s educational attainment. This is also evident from the 
drop in chi-square values of likelihood statistics, a measure of time dependence. The 
relatively marginal drop in cell probabilities following additional control for son’s 
occupation is not surprising given that we already control for education and it is the 
human capital development of sons that may have facilitated occupational mobility 
from farm to non-farm activities, particularly for the poor fathers. Hence, of all the 
characteristics, son’s education appears to be the key to mobility in wealth. 
  However, as pointed our earlier, it is difficult to compare the degree of relative 
mobility for different samples only on the basis of the underlying transition matrices 
or  indicators  of  time  dependence  (such  as  chi-square  tests).  Some  corresponding 
summary statistics (of positional movement) are required for the purpose of ranking 
the matrices. We therefore turn to indices of mobility presented in Table 2. Column 1 
reports  the  indices  that  correspond  to  transition  matrix  for  raw  wealth  data  while 
columns 2-5 incrementally adjust son’s wealth data for various covariates of wealth. 
As we move across the columns from left to right, there is an increase in the value of 
the indices  for  all samples. The observed increase in  mobility thus highlights  the 
underlying forces for initial persistence in wealth in raw data. 
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Table 2: Indices of wealth mobility, father-son pairs 
 
    1  2  3  4  5 
             
Full sample  Correlation coefficient   0.50  0.43  0.30  0.30  0.28 
  Prais index  0.84  0.88  0.93  0.93  0.93 
  Atkinson et al. Mobility Ratio  0.26  0.30  0.35  0.35  0.36 
  Average Jump  1.02  1.14  1.27  1.27  1.29 
             
Inherited   Correlation coefficient  0.51  0.45  0.31  0.31  0.29 
Households  Prais index  0.83  0.86  0.93  0.93  0.93 
  Atkinson et al. Mobility Ratio  0.25  0.29  0.35  0.35  0.36 
  Average Jump  1.00  1.12  1.27  1.27  1.29 
             
Spilt-off  Correlation coefficient  0.50  0.40  0.28  0.29  0.27 
households  Prais index  0.87  0.90  0.93  0.93  0.94 
  Atkinson et al. Mobility Ratio  0.27  0.31  0.35  0.35  0.36 
  Average Jump  1.07  1.16  1.27  1.27  1.29 
Note: column 1 refers to raw data; column 2 uses age (and age squared) adjusted residuals from OLS 
regressions; column 3 uses age and education adjusted data; columns 4 & 5 additionally adjust for 
family-size and occupation respectively (using OLS residual). 
 
To get a better idea about the extent of mobility displayed by various matrices, 
reported  values  of  the  indices  need  to  be  compared  with  values  assumed  under 
“perfect mobility”. The correlation coefficient ranges from 0 to 1 (no mobility) so that 
the value of 0.50 for the full sample implies that 50% of the variation in son’s wealth 
is attributable to his father’s wealth. When the transition matrix is defined in terms of 
deciles,  the  expected  average  jump  in  a  state  of  perfect  mobility  is  3.30;  where 
quintiles are used, this benchmark is scaled down to 1.65. Thus the range of “average 
jump” index from 1.02 to 1.29 for the full sample represents 64% to 96% of the value 
under  perfect  mobility.  Similarly,  when  there  is  perfect  mobility,  all  transition 
probabilities are equal to 0.20 so that Atkinson et al index, Shorrocks’ MET and 
determinant index converge to a value of 0.52, 1 and 1 respectively. As evidenced in 
Table 2, Atkinson et al. index shoots from about 0.30 (age-adjusted data, column 2) to 
0.36 (OLS residuals  with  age,  education, occupation and family size  adjustments, 
column  5).  This  is  equivalent  to  11%  increase  in  mobility.  Nevertheless,  careful 17 
 
comparison confirms our earlier finding that control for son’s education leads to most 
of the gains in mobility. 
We also implemented various robustness checks to verify the above results. To 
check the sensitivity of our results to measurement error, we also used residuals from 
median regressions
11. However, our results go through. We additionally controlled for 
inheritance  of  headship  and  tested  whether  the  results  were  affected  by  the 
endogeneity of certain covariates (e.g. family size and inheritance of headship). To 
this end, residuals from IV regressions were used to compute the transition matrices 
for the full sample. Once again, our results remained robust. 
  Turning to results for  various sub-samples, the same pattern holds for the 
sample of sons who head inherited households and split -offs. Initially, the mobility 
indices (computed using raw as well as age-adjusted wealth data) have slightly higher 
values for split-offs suggesting that moving out of parent’s household leads to greater 
mobility. However, once we additionally adjust wealth data for education, family size, 
and occupation, almost all the indices converge to same set of values (columns 3-5). 
This is particularly evident as we look at the transition probabilities in Table 1 for 
these three samples. After detailed control, a large number of the cell probabilities 
converge to a value in the neighbourhood of 0.20, the perfect mobility benchmark for 
cell probabilities. Once again, the largest fall follows from additional control for son’s 
educational attainment suggesting that, like the full sample, education remains the key 
drivers of mobility for the sub-samples. 
                                                 
11 Compared to OLS, median regressions are more robust to outliers.  18 
 
Regression analysis 
Table  3  reports  regression  estimates  of  (mean)  persistence  in  wealth  for  the  full 
sample.  The  sample  characteristics  along  with  descriptive  statistics  of  the  wealth 
indices  are  reported  in  Appendix  Table  A2.  The  OLS  estimate  of  father-son 
persistence falls from 0.53 (column 1) to 0.35 (column 2) as we additionally control 
for son’s age, education, family size and occupation. However, the largest fall occurs 
when  we  add  the  education  variable.  Despite  significant  occupational  transitions 
observed in the Matlab villages over the last three decades, occupational mobility 
does not seem to have any impact on wealth mobility. To test this more explicitly, we 
re-ran  column  2  specification  (with  and  without  control  for  son’s  education) 
additionally  controlling  for  father’s  occupation  so  that  the  coefficients  on  son’s 
occupations  would  capture  the  effect  of  occupational  change  across  generations 
(results  not  shown).  In  neither of the two experiments,  the coefficient  on father’s 
wealth changed significantly confirming that occupational mobility did not contribute 
to wealth mobility in our data. 
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Table 3: Regression estimates of intergenerational correlation in wealth [Dependent variable: son’s wealth] 
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
   OLS  OLS  IV  IV  OLS  IV  IV  FE  FE-IV  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE-IV 
Father’s wealth  0.538  0.357  0.546  0.476  0.37  0.444  0.492  0.303  0.49  0.561  0.292  0.457  0.535 
   (50.14)**  (28.21)**  (9.06)**  (6.57)**  (29.03)**  (6.03)**  (8.32)**  (15.30)**  (4.12)**  (6.47)**  (14.78)**  (3.73)**  (6.09)** 
Schooling     0.047  0.034  0.041  0.048  0.042  0.038  0.042  0.037  0.032  0.033  0.03  0.025 
      (20.48)**  (7.13)**  (6.99)**  (20.75)**  (7.09)**  (7.48)**  (14.71)**  (5.81)**  (6.86)**  (10.82)**  (4.79)**  (5.33)** 
Household size     0.049  0.049  -0.083  0.046  -0.101  -0.082  0.057  -0.141  -0.06  0.057  -0.154  -0.068 
     (12.98)**  (12.49)**  (2.24)*  (12.07)**  (2.64)**  (2.42)*  (11.89)**  (1.63)  (0.94)  (11.99)**  (1.75)+  (1.08) 
Self-employed, non- agriculture     -0.066  -0.037  -0.068  -0.021  -0.068  -0.057  -0.017  -0.038  -0.033  -0.021  -0.045  -0.039 
     (3.44)**  (1.67)+  (2.59)**  (1.18)  (2.58)**  (2.29)*  (0.73)  (1.24)  (1.2)  (0.91)  (1.41)  (1.4) 
Wage-employed, non- agriculture.     -0.086  -0.055  -0.106  -0.046  -0.109  -0.094  -0.024  -0.066  -0.049  -0.03  -0.076  -0.058 
     (4.33)**  (2.43)*  (3.52)**  (2.42)*  (3.60)**  (3.39)**  (1.08)  (1.97)*  (1.72)+  (1.26)  (2.21)*  (2.01)* 
Wage-employed, agricultural. labour     -0.221  -0.189  -0.282  -.218   -0.289  -0.268  -.205   -0.292  -0.238  -.211   -0.307  -0.249 
     (7.50)**  (5.97)**  (6.26)**  (6.99)**   (6.33)**  (6.39)**  (5.41)**   (4.27)**  (4.40)**  (5.60)**   (4.39)**  (4.59)** 
OUemp     -0.109  -0.084  -0.139  -0.083  -0.165  -0.154  -0.077  -0.168  -0.142  -0.078  -0.175  -0.147 
      (1.90)+  (1.42)  (1.89)+  (1.48)  (2.20)*  (2.17)*  (1.2)  (1.98)*  (1.91)+  (1.22)  (2.03)*  (1.99)* 
Inherited household              0.095  0.207  0.227  0.049  0.171  0.175  0.052  0.179  0.185 
               (6.04)**  (6.79)**  (4.28)**  (2.81)**  (3.32)**  (2.29)*  (3.03)**  (3.42)**  (2.42)* 
Spousal education                                0.026  0.025  0.024 
                                 (7.48)**  (5.21)**  (5.91)** 
Constant  1.031  0.882  0.769  0.433  0.795  0.372  0.397  1.224  0.437  0.645  1.226  0.42  0.636 
   (71.20)**  (7.63)**  (6.15)**  (2.70)**  (6.90)**  (2.27)*  (2.49)*  (8.60)**  (1.25)  (2.25)*  (8.69)**  (1.18)  (2.21)* 
Adjusted R
2  0.29  0.39        0.39        0.25        0.26       
Bari fixed effects  No   No   No   No   No   No   No   Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Over-identification test  -  -  0.35  0.04  -   0.25  0.28  -   0.09  0.01  -   0.13  0.01 
Exogeneity test  -  -  0  0  -   0  0  -   0  0  -   0  0 
N  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044  5044 
Note: Robust t-stats are reported. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions control for individual’s age, age-squared and religion. Model 
(3) instruments father’s wealth (in 1974) by father’s occupation and education. Models 4 and 6 additionally instrument son’s family size by “treatment area dummy” and “sex 
of eldest child” (of the son). In addition to father’s wealth and son’s family size, Model 7 also instruments household inheritance by i) head’s birth order (in 1974) and (ii) 
difference between head’s schooling and the maximum of that among his siblings. Model 8-13 repeats models (5)-(7) with bari fixed effects (1775 dummies) and with and 
without control for spousal education. Test of exogeneity (of instrumented variables i.e. father’s wealth, son’s household size and so on) is based on Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test with the null that the variable is exogenous. Over-identification test (overid) is based on Hansen’s J-statistics. Only p-values are reported for the two tests. 20 
 
  It may be recalled that inclusion of father’s wealth and son’s family size are 
problematic  due  to  the  problem  of  measurement  error  and  the  endogeneity 
respectively
12. To examine the bias in our regression estimate of wealth persistence, 
model  3  jointly  instruments  father’s  wealth  and  son’s  family  size.  Excluded 
instruments  are  father’s  education  and  two  occupation  dummies  (indicating 
participation in self-employment in agriculture and non-agriculture). The instruments 
for family size are (i) a treatment area dummy and (ii) a dummy indicating whether 
sex of first child is a son
13. Instrumenting father’s wealth always leads to a significant 
increase in our estimate of persistence in wealth. Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic 
comfortably rejects the exogeneity of father’s wealth in all cases. This finding tends to 
support  the  view  that  OLS  estimates  are  possibly  downward  biased  due  to  the 
presence of measurement error. 
However, given the nature of our excluded instruments, it is not possible to be 
conclusive about the exact source of any potential bias. The use of occupation and 
education as excluded instruments for father’s wealth implies that the IV estimate of 
the coefficient on father’s wealth reflects father-son persistence in the earned income 
or measured portion of wealth (as predicted by his human capital and occupational 
choices). Like father’s wealth, these two instruments remain potentially correlated 
with unobserved earnings endowment (such as innate ability) that is common between 
fathers and sons. If true, father’s wealth is endogenous and the reported IV estimates 
are unlikely to be robust to such problem.  
  Interestingly, the inclusion of the son’s family size variable has no effect on 
the  size  of  the  coefficient  on  father’s  wealth,  even  when  we  treat  family  size  as 
                                                 
12 However, as pointed out before, father’s wealth could be additionally endogenous. 
13 We estimated separate models where we individually treated father’s wealth and son’s family size as 
endogenous. In both cases, our instruments comfortably passed the over-identification test. However, 
for the sake of brevity, we have suppressed these results. 21 
 
endogenous.  The  latter  has  a  significant  effect  on  son’s  wealth  (+ve  in  OLS 
specification and -ve in IV). Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic comfortably rejects the 
exogeneity  of  family  size  in  all  cases  at  5%  level.  The  excluded  instruments  are 
always highly significant in the first stage regressions and pass the validity test in 8 
out of 12 cases
14. Models 5 and 6 further expand the regression specification with 
control for inheritance of household headship. Model 7 additionally instruments the 
headship inheritance dummy by tw o (retrospective) measures of within household 
inequality. 
  Models 8-13 in the Table 3 extend models 2-7 with additional control for bari 
fixed effects. These fixed effects wipe out correlation between households that are 
located in the same bari. Within-bari correlation in household wealth arises because 
some of the households were joint in recent past and therefore, may have shared 
significant economic ties. As a further robustness check, we repeated our analysis 
with additional indices of household  wealt h,  constructed following the principal 
component  analysis
15  and  weights  derived  from  expenditure  regression  (results 
suppressed)
16. However, our findings go through.  
It may be recalled that the father’s wealth variable is a generated regressor in 
our model so that inference may be incorrect. This is particularly a problem if t-
statistics are marginally significant and standard errors are biased downwards. The t-
statistics reported in Table 3 are very large for all of the key variables of interest, 
particularly father’s wealth. We therefore test whether our inference is compromised 
by  bootstrapping  the  standard  errors  (results  not  shown).  However,  our  earlier 
                                                 
14  However,  they  pass  in  all  cases  only  if  IV  regressions  with  endogenous  family  size  and  un-
instrumented parental wealth are considered. 
15 There is no consensus on the choice of the number of factors. We followed the existing practice and 
chose the first factor. 
16 To be precise, an alternative set of coefficients as weights was obtained by regressing household per 
capita expenditure on indicators of household quality and assets with additional control for schooling of 
head and his spouse. 22 
 
conclusions hold; while bootstrapped standard errors in some cases yield smaller t-
statistics, they still remain significant at the conventional level. 
  Similar  results  are  reported  for  sons  who  head  split-offs  and  inherited 
households (see Appendix, Table A3). Simultaneously correcting for the measurement 
error in father’s wealth and endogeneity of son’s family size and controlling for all 
other covariates, the resulting estimates suggest higher persistence for sons heading 
inherited households. However, it is not known whether the difference in persistence 
with the split-offs is significant at conventional levels. 
5.2  Inter-temporal mobility in wealth 
Compared to intergenerational mobility, inter-temporal mobility is primarily affected 
by life-cycle events such as variation in the size and the composition of the household. 
The level of savings varies across the life cycle: younger heads have lower savings 
and  earnings,  which  tend  to  peak  in  the  middle  of  the  life  cycle.  By  then,  the 
dependency  ratio  also  alters  favourably  as  adult  sons  enter  the  labour  market. 
However, at retirement, savings start to deplete.  The process of household partition 
sets in when sons separate from the patriarch. This altogether could create downward 
mobility,  due  to  the  loss  of  household  economies  of  scale  in  consumption  and 
production  (Drèze  et  al.  1998).  In  contrast  to  these  life-cycle  factors,  the  role  of 
unobservables  is,  however,  limited.  Since  ability  is  likely  to  be  more  correlated 
between periods of an individuals’ life than between generations of a family, one 
would expect greater intergenerational mobility than inter-temporal mobility. 
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Table 4: Indices of mobility in wealth, 1974-1996 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
Correlation coefficient  0.53  0.52  0.38  0.38  0.37 
Prais index  0.84  0.84  0.90  0.90  0.91 
Atkinson et al. mobility ratio  0.26  0.26  0.33  0.33  0.34 
Average jump  1.04  1.04  1.19  1.19  1.22 
Note: column 1 refers to raw data; column 2 uses age and age squared adjusted data (residuals from 
OLS regressions); column 3 additionally adjusts for education; columns 4 & 5 additionally correct 
wealth data for family-size and occupation (using residuals from OLS) respectively. 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the transition 
matrices;  only  the  corresponding  indices  of  mobility  are  presented.   
For this sample, the principal cause of mobility is life cyclical and emanates from the 
permanent income hypothesis. Individuals tend to experience low mobility earlier in 
life. Income increases with age, but at retirement it declines as savings are depleted 
and  transfers  are  made  to  progeny.  Similar  to  our  analysis  of  intergenerational 
mobility, we report transition matrix with corrections for age, as some individuals are 
likely to be in the middle of their life cycle in 1974. There is substantial persistence in 
an inter-temporal context: individuals with poor initial wealth tend to be worse-off 
later in life. Given the gap of 22 years between the base period and the final period, 
time dependence is substantial. This is true even after adjusting for changes in the 
family size and controlling for an individual’s age. Once we adjust for educational 
attainment,  the  probability  of  being  on  the  diagonal  axis  is  substantially  reduced, 
perhaps  implying that  the lack of education also  limits  mobility during one’s life 
cycle. This is similar to intergenerational mobility, where persistence weakens once 
such adjustments are made. Furthermore, a comparison of intergenerational and inter-
temporal  mobility  indices  (Table  2  vs.  Table  4)  suggests  that  persistence  is  not 
necessarily  greater  in  an  inter-temporal  context.  To  the  extent  ability  is  more 
correlated between periods of a person’s life than generations of the same family, this 24 
 
finding suggests that ability plays a smaller role in determining economic mobility in 
rural Bangladesh.  
5.3  Intergenerational schooling mobility 
Since the distribution of schooling in 1974 was skewed (i.e. the majority of fathers 
being  uneducated), we  do not  compute the quantile transition  matrix.  Instead, we 
classify individuals in five distinct groups on the basis of their levels of schooling. 
These are: no education, less than primary education (grade 1-4 completion), primary 
education (grade 5 completion), junior secondary education (grade 6-8) and secondary 
education (grade 9 and above). The resultant transition matrices of schooling for the 
sample of father-son pairs are reported in the Appendix Table A4. The corresponding 
indices of mobility/immobility are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Indices of schooling mobility, father-son pairs 
 
  All sons  Inherited  Split-offs 
Correlation coefficient  0.39  0.40  0.35 
Prais index  0.83  0.82  0.86 
Atkinson et al. mobility ratio  0.32  0.31  0.35 
Average jump  1.17  1.13  1.25 
 
 
Intergenerational persistence is very high among sons of uneducated fathers- 
almost 60% of them stay uneducated whilst only 14% manage to obtain education 
beyond primary schooling. Interestingly, split-offs have less time independence than 
sons who head inherited households (as indicated by relatively smaller values of chi-
square test statistics). This is consistent with the larger values of the mobility indices 
for split-offs indicating greater positional movement. Using the benchmark figures of 
these indices under the state of perfect mobility, it is possible to assess the relative 
mobility experienced by individuals in different samples. For example, the “average 
jump” index yields 68% mobility for inherited household heads compared to 75% for 25 
 
split-offs
17. Similarly, The Atkinson  et al. index yields 59% mobility for inherited 
household heads compared to 67% for split-offs
18. The value of correlation coefficient 
is 0.39 for the full sample and implies that 39% of the variation in son’s education is 
attributable to variation in the father’s schooling. 
  However for the split-offs, the direction of mobility is mostly downward-- the 
probability of descending from the top group to the bottom (i.e. staying uneducated 
when fathers have completed secondary education or above) is 0.19 compared to only 
0.07 for the sample of inherited households. Our finding that sons who experience 
greater downward mobility in schooling are also heads of split-offs is consistent with 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001). For Indian data, they report that sons who splinter 
from  parents  have  lower  school  attainment  compared  to  those  who  headed  intact 
households. 
  Given the evidence of a lack of intergenerational mobility in schooling, one is 
interested  to  know  whether  schooling  persistence  has  declined  over  time  and  its 
implications  economic  mobility.  The  relationship  between  schooling  mobility  and 
earnings (economic) mobility has been formalised in a simple model discussed in 








Equation (3) specifies earnings as a function of schooling attainment whilst equation 
(4) expresses schooling as a function of parental income. The parameters  and  
stand for labour market returns to education and elasticity of schooling with respect to 
                                                 
17 These figures are computed by comparing the raw values to the benchmark figure (under perfect 
mobility) of 1.65. 
18 These figures are computed by comparing the raw values to the benchmark figure (under perfect 
mobility) of 0.52. 
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parental  wealth,  respectively.  If  we  combine  equations  (3)  and  (4)  by  expressing 
earnings  as  a  function  of  parental  wealth,  equation  (3)  reduces  to  equation  (5). 
According  to  Solon,  the  intergenerational  mobility  parameter  is  now  ΦΨ.  This 
interpretation  of  the  intergenerational  correlation  has  the  following  implication. 
Earnings mobility is higher if schooling attainment is sensitive to parental education 
and the returns to education are positive. Analysis of labour market earnings data 
suggests that, , the average returns to education in Bangladesh is 8% (Asadullah, 
2006). If sensitivity of schooling vis-à-vis parental income distribution (i.e. parameter 
Ψ) turns out to be high and stable over time, this would undermine economic mobility 
in the future.   
  Table 6 reports regression estimates of intergenerational persistence in school 
completion. The OLS regression of sons’ schooling on that of their fathers (with no 
other covariates included) yields an estimate of 0.51 which drops somewhat with the 
inclusion  of  mother’s  education.  The  coefficient  on  father’s  schooling  reduces 
furthermore to 0.29 with the inclusion of father’s wealth. The effect of parental wealth 
is also evident from the jump in adjusted R
2 values (from 0.17 to 0.27). However, no 
further changes occur to the coefficient on father’s wealth as we additionally control 
for  father’s  age,  family  size,  occupation  and  village  of  residence.  Hence,  net  of 
parental wealth and maternal education, the influence of father’s schooling on that of 
the son remains large and significant. 
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Table 6: OLS estimates of intergenerational persistence in schooling, 1974 
[Dependent variable: son’s years of schooling completed] 
 
1974 sample             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Father’s education  0.515  0.416  0.290  0.290  0.285  0.273 
  (25.92)**  (18.50)**  (12.82)**  (12.72)**  (12.53)**  (12.75)** 
Mother's education    0.512  0.397  0.395  0.410  0.369 
    (10.04)**  (8.20)**  (8.13)**  (8.44)**  (8.16)** 
Father’s wealth      1.897  1.863  1.767  1.858 
      (22.10)**  (21.55)**  (19.51)**  (20.04)** 
Control for father’s family size?  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Control for father’s age?  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Control for father’s occupation?   No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.15  0.17  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.26 
Village fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
N  4150  4150  4150  4150  4150  4150 
1996 sample             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Father’s education  0.442  0.308  0.216  0.184  0.184  0.186 
  (33.71)**  (18.89)**  (13.58)**  (12.25)**  (12.24)**  (12.36)** 
Mother's education    0.331  0.254  0.211  0.210  0.219 
    (13.97)**  (11.23)**  (9.86)**  (9.79)**  (10.15)** 
Father’s wealth      1.946  1.638  1.646  1.601 
      (24.50)**  (21.49)**  (21.31)**  (20.52)** 
Control for father’s family size?  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Control for father’s age?  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Control for father’s occupation?   No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.18  0.22  0.30  0.38  0.38  0.38 
Village fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
N  4924  4924  4924  4924  4924  4924 
Note: (1) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. (2) In regression models based on 1974 data, sons are restricted to be of school age 
(aged 24 years or less) whilst sons are restricted to be aged 17-24 years in regressions based on 1996 
sample. (3) Regressions include a dummy for missing data on mother’s education. (4) Fixed-effects 
specification controls for village location. 
 
 
Table 6 therefore confirms that Ψ is large and positive -- schooling attainment is very 
sensitive to family background in 1974. It is therefore important to ascertain whether 
Ψ has declined over time. To this end, the bottom panel of Table 6 reports estimates of 
schooling persistence using data on a sample of household heads and their adult co-
resident sons in 1996. Clearly, intergenerational persistence in schooling has remained 
largely stable when we  consider correlation  for  a much  younger cohort of school 28 
 
graduates. This is evident if we compare the coefficients on father’s wealth across 
1974 and 1996 samples.   
In  sum,  returns  to  education  are  significant  and  positive  in  Bangladesh. 
However,  the  fact  that  Ψ  has  remained  stable  over  time  suggests  that  school 
attainment in rural Bangladesh is unequally distributed across socio-economic groups. 
This  in  turn has  limited upward  economic mobility  and reinforced the  process  of 
intergenerational persistence.    
5.4  Intergenerational wealth mobility and occupational diversification  
The results presented in sections 5.1 confirm that occupation mobility is significant in 
the Matlab region. Yet, its contribution to wealth mobility is found to be limited. This 
finding is puzzling given significant occupational mobility across generations in our 
data. As discussed in section 2, there have been significant changes in the sectoral 
composition of the labour force in the Matlab region during the study period. A large 
number of individuals switched from agriculture to non-farm activities between 1974 
and 1996
19.  
The puzzle of weak correlation between occupational and wealth mobility is 
explained by the fact that much of the occupational mobility out of agriculture is 
caused  by  push  factors.  Sons  may  have  been  pushed  into  low-productivity  self-
employment type activities owing to an increase in landlessness in the country. This 
possibility is also supported by the fact that not all non-farm activities are associated 
with high income. For instance, Sen (1996) finds that income growth in non-farm 
sector is higher than that in agricultural wage employment if non-farm wage sector is 
excluded. For these reasons, therefore, despite transformation of the rural labour force 
                                                 
19 Similar pattern is also documented in Hossain et al. (2002) who study occupational change in rural 
Bangladesh during 1987-2000. 29 
 
in  Bangladesh,  the  level  of  per  capita  rural  non-farm  income  did  not  increase 
(Mahmud, 1996). 
In sum, it is indeed a puzzle that significant occupational diversification has 
occurred in the Matlab region despite no impact on intergenerational wealth mobility. 
This puzzle is explained by the fact much of the occupational change from farm to 
non-farm activities was owing to push factors. Sons may have been pushed into low-
return  non-farm  activities  which  do  not  require  much  human  capital.  This  also 
explains occupational mobility at a relatively low level of schooling. 
6  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  looked  at  the  nature  and  extent  of  wealth  mobility  among  male 
household-heads in Matlab villages in Bangladesh. While we did not have access to a 
panel  dataset  containing  repeated  information  on  father-son  pairs,  we  have  used 
retrospective residential records on a sample of current household-heads to track their 
households of origin and parents. This has been possible by linking census records on 
household-heads in the Matlab villages in 1996 to their parents on whom data was 
collected in an earlier census in 1974. By construction, the resultant dataset permits a 
study of mobility only among those sons who have remained in the study area over 
the  last  22  years.  Given  that  we  chose  bari  as  the  primary  sampling  unit  for  the 
selection of households, our dataset contains most of the adult sons who currently 
heads individual households in the study area. However, sample attrition owing to 
non-random omission of split-offs (moving out of the study area) could still bias the 
estimates  of  mobility  and  its  various  determinants  (Rosenzweig,  2003).  This 
possibility remains an important limitation of our study. In addition to sample attrition 
problem, the results can be also biased in presence of economic and health shocks to 
households. Since we do not have data on shocks, the estimates presented for son’s 30 
 
wealth, son’s education and other variables in  wealth persistence regressions  may 
suffer from omitted variable bias. With these caveats in mind, the following results 
emanate from this study. 
We find large intergenerational persistence in raw (and age-adjusted) wealth 
data, particularly at the two tails of the wealth distribution. However, such persistence 
weakens  once  we  additionally  net  out  contribution  of  son’s  education,  household 
inheritance and family size to his wealth. The fall in transition probabilities (on the 
diagonal axis) is the largest when we adjust for educational attainment, indicating that 
differential schooling is the key source of persistence in wealth across generations of 
the same family. The cell probabilities remain largely stable once we occupational 
differences among fathers and sons are controlled for. Regression analysis of wealth 
data yields an estimate of father-son wealth elasticity in the range of 0.77 and 0.53. 
This is much larger than the existing estimates for developed countries and confirms 
the commonly held view that economic mobility is in developing societies
20.  
In addition to wealth mobility, we also assess mo bility in school completion. 
Transition matrices reveal that mobility is very low among children of uneducated 
fathers: almost 60% of them stay uneducated while only 14% manage to obtain 
education beyond primary schooling. Overall, the lack of educational  mobility in 
Matlab  villages  is  striking.  And  it  remains  the  most  important  determinant  of 
economic mobility in our data. Comparisons of intergenerational schooling mobility 
and the elasticity of son’s schooling with respect to the father’s wealth between two 
cohorts suggest that schooling persistence has not declined much over time.  
                                                 
20 The estimate for the US data is 0.37, before the transfer of bequests (Charles and Hurst, 2003). 
Another study using the US data is Menchik (1979) where the correlation coefficient lies between 0.48 
and 0.50. However, the sample size used is very small. 
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  An  additional  contribution  of  this  paper  is  the  construction  of  profiles  of 
generational mobility for sons by inheritance of household headship. As such, we 
shed  some  light  on  a  key  demographic  source  of  immobility  in  rural  societies: 
household  partition.  While  moving  out  of  the  household  of  the  patriarch  creates 
greater mobility in wealth accumulation for sons, we find that in most cases it is 
downward.  Interestingly,  sons  who  experience  greater  downward  mobility  in 
schooling are those who also head split-offs. This, in part, explains why split-offs tend 
to experience greater downward mobility in wealth. 
  The  above  findings  have  serious  implications  for  the  process  of  economic 
development.  Large  persistence  over  the  life-cycle  implies  that  poverty-trap  may 
exist: individuals who continue with poorer wealth may continue to remain poor over 
a longer period of time. For many of these individuals, this is unlikely to change 
across generations, as evidenced in the lack of intergenerational mobility in wealth. 
One policy option to remove these disadvantages in the initial condition is to equalize 
educational  opportunities.  Large  scale  investment  in  rural  schooling  infrastructure 
undertaken by the government of Bangladesh over the past two decades is therefore 
well-placed. The success of these investments in raising economic mobility in later 
life would, nevertheless, depend on the progressivity of these investments i.e. to what 
extent  they  facilitate  increase  schooling  attainment  for  all  groups,  particularly  the 
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Table A1: Summary statistics and (regression) weights relating to household asset and 
housing quality variables used in the construction of household wealth index 
 
  (1)  (2)  MHSS, 96  MSEC, 96 
  Asset  LnPCE  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Household has a cow  0.191**  0.041  0.42  0.49  0.33  0.47 
  (4.97)**  (2.10)*         
Household has a boat  0.049  0.079  0.31  0.46  0.28  0.45 
  (1.19)  (3.76)**         
Household has a radio  0.311  0.103  0.48  0.50  0.39  0.49 
  (6.93)**  (4.47)**         
Household has a watch  0.129  0.156  0.59  0.49  0.49  0.50 
  (2.72)**  (6.41)**         
Household has a hurricane  0.106  -0.009  0.91  0.29  0.88  0.33 
  (1.59)  (0.25)         
Household has a quilt  0.348  0.127  0.62  0.48  0.54  0.50 
  (7.23)**  (5.13)**         
Roof of largest room made of tin  0.535  0.072  0.97  0.16  0.96  0.19 
  (4.52)**  (1.18)         
Wall of largest room made of tin  0.656  0.160  0.52  0.50  0.43  0.50 
  (14.82)**  (7.04)**         
Tube well (source of drinking water)  0.401  0.023  0.95  0.22  0.94  0.24 
  (4.75)**  (0.53)         
Tube well (source of cooking water)  0.221  0.057  0.06  0.24  0.04  0.20 
  (1.90)+  (0.95)         
Tube well (source of bath water)  0.171  0.142  0.06  0.24  0.03  0.18 
  (1.41)  (2.29)*         
Tube well (source of water for washing)  0.274  0.221  0.03  0.17  0.01  0.12 
  (1.75)+  (2.76)**         
Adjusted R
2  0.38  0.28         
N  3423  3421  3423    5044   
Mean of dependent variable  10.64  9.22         
Stan. Dev. of dependent variable  1.35  0.64         
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant 
at 1%. All the variables apart from the dependent variables are dummies. Column (1) refers to the 
regression where the dependent variable is household asset value. It also controls for education of the head, 
his spouse and household size. Column 2 (regression using household expenditure as the dependent 




 Table A2: Mean statistics of sample of sons 
   Full  Inherit  Split-off 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Age  39.00  8.72  41.33  9.39  36.42  7.07 
Age squared  1597.10  745.03  1796.90  833.59  1376.22  554.82 
Non Muslim  0.15  0.36  0.16  0.37  0.14  0.35 
Married  0.96  0.20  0.94  0.23  0.97  0.16 
Household size  5.50  2.00  6.00  2.22  4.94  1.55 
Spousal education  1.98  2.84  2.01  2.89  1.94  2.78 
Schooling (numbers of grade completed)  3.22  3.70  3.59  3.82  2.82  3.52 
Self-employed in agriculture  0.30  0.46  0.34  0.47  0.26  0.44 
Self-employed in non-agriculture  0.35  0.48  0.33  0.47  0.38  0.49 
Wage-employed in non-agriculture  0.23  0.42  0.23  0.42  0.24  0.43 
Wage-employed in (agricultural) labour  0.07  0.25  0.06  0.24  0.08  0.27 
Unemployed  0.01  0.11  0.02  0.13  0.01  0.08 
Others  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.05 
OUemp (others + unemployed)  0.02  0.13  0.02  0.15  0.01  0.10 
First child is a daughter  0.40  0.49  0.38  0.48  0.43  0.50 
Wealth index  1.64  0.66  1.76  0.67  1.52  0.64 
Alternative wealth index  0.39  0.23  0.43  0.24  0.35  0.22 
Residence in treatment area  0.56  0.50  0.56  0.50  0.57  0.50 
Inherited household  0.53  0.50  -  -  -  - 
Birth order (in 1974)  1.78  0.98  -  -  -  - 
Gap between own schooling and maximum of  1.38  2.64  -  -  -  - 
that among siblings (in 1974)                   
Parental characteristics (based on MSEC 1974)             
Father’s age  54.72  10.79  -  -  -  - 
Father’s wealth index  1.14  0.66  1.17  0.66  1.10  0.66 
Father’s wealth index (alternative)  0.27  0.19  0.28  0.19  0.26  0.19 
Father’s education  1.94  2.78  2.18  2.94  1.67  2.56 
Mother's education  0.36  1.18  0.42  1.30  0.29  1.04 
Mother's education missing  0.08  0.26  0.09  0.28  0.06  0.24 
Father self-employed in agriculture  0.47  0.50  0.48  0.50  0.46  0.50 
Father self-employed in non-agriculture  0.16  0.37  0.15  0.35  0.18  0.38 
Father wage-employed in non-labour  0.10  0.30  0.11  0.31  0.10  0.30 
Father wage-employed in (agricultural) labour  0.20  0.40  0.19  0.39  0.22  0.41 
Father unemployed  0.05  0.21  0.06  0.23  0.03  0.18 
Father in other jobs  0.02  0.12  0.02  0.13  0.01  0.12 
N  5044    2648    2396   
Note: The wealth index uses coefficients on household assets in a regression of household asset value (in 
logs) as weights. Alternative wealth indices are constructed using weights that are derived from household 
expenditure regressions. 36 
 
 Table A3: Regression estimates of intergenerational correlation in wealth, inherited and 






   OLS  OLS  IV  IV  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Father’s wealth  0.549  0.382  0.643  0.516  0.507  0.339  0.368  0.354 
   (37.99)**  (21.34)**  (8.06)**  (4.13)**  (31.98)**  (18.92)**  (4.11)**  (3.80)** 
Schooling    0.045  0.025  0.038    0.046  0.044  0.043 
     (14.31)**  (3.83)**  (3.46)**    (13.17)**  (6.56)**  (6.17)** 
Household size    0.046  0.045  -0.081    0.036  0.036  -0.073 
     (10.28)**  (9.60)**  (1.32)    (4.86)**  (4.75)**  (1.69)+ 
Self-employed in     -0.095  -0.056  -0.106    -0.016  -0.011  -0.008 
 non-agriculture    (3.61)**  (1.87)+  (2.37)*    (0.56)  (0.35)  (0.24) 
Wage-employed in     -0.089  -0.05  -0.111    -0.064  -0.059  -0.079 
 non-agriculture    (3.25)**  (1.62)  (2.27)*    (2.23)*  (1.79)+  (2.23)* 
Wage-employed,    -0.287  -0.245  -0.36    -0.142  -0.137  -0.179 
 agricultural labour    (6.51)**  (5.19)**  (4.40)**    (3.63)**  (3.28)**  (3.85)** 
OUemp    -0.1  -0.071  -0.104    -0.172  -0.169  -0.285 
     (1.46)  (1.00)  (1.17)    (1.90)+  (1.85)+  (2.80)** 
Constant  1.111  1.284  1.10  1.025  0.963  0.661  0.638  0.295 
   (52.75)**  (8.12)**  (6.15)**  (5.42)**  (49.12)**  (3.24)**  (2.96)**  (1.11) 
Adjusted R
2  0.30  0.39  -  -  0.27  0.37  -  - 
Over-identification test  -  -  0.27  0.07  -  -  0.99  0.99 
Exogeneity test  -  -  0  0  -  -  0.74  0.02 
N  2648  2648  2648  2648  2396  2396  2396  2396 
Note:  Excluded  occupation  dummy  is  self-employment  in  agriculture.  All  regressions  control  for 
individual’s age, age-squared and religion. Instruments for father’s wealth (in 1974) are father’s occupation 
while instruments for son’s family size are “treatment area dummy” and “sex of eldest child” (of the son). 
Robust standard errors are reported. Test of exogeneity (of father’s wealth and son’s household size) is 
based on Durbin-Wu-Hausman test with the null that the variable is exogenous. Over-identification test is 
based on Hansen’s J-statistics. Only p-values are reported for the two tests. 37 
 
Table A4: Transition matrices of schooling, father-son pairs 
      Sons 









  Secondary 
or above 
      1  2  3  4  5 
    1  0.59  0.18  0.09  0.06  0.08 
  Full sample  2  0.36  0.22  0.14  0.11  0.18 
    3  0.28  0.21  0.16  0.15  0.2 
    4  0.15  0.18  0.19  0.14  0.34 
    5  0.11  0.12  0.07  0.15  0.55 
  Pearson’s 
2            842.63 
  Likelihood 
2            791.00 
      1  2  3  4  5 
    1  0.56  0.19  0.09  0.07  0.09 
Fathers  Inherited   2  0.32  0.23  0.15  0.11  0.19 
  households  3  0.26  0.22  0.16  0.16  0.2 
    4  0.13  0.17  0.19  0.17  0.35 
    5  0.07  0.13  0.04  0.16  0.6 
  Pearson’s 
2            514.98 
  Likelihood 
2            492.40 
      1  2  3  4  5 
    1  0.61  0.17  0.09  0.06  0.07 
  Split-offs   2  0.41  0.22  0.11  0.1  0.16 
    3  0.31  0.2  0.16  0.14  0.2 
    4  0.18  0.21  0.19  0.1  0.31 
    5  0.19  0.11  0.11  0.13  0.46 
  Pearson’s 
2            308.58 
  Likelihood 




Appendix Note: Construction of the working sample 
a. Source datasets 
The data on 141 villages  of the Matlab thana  used in  this  study  comes  from  the 
ICDDR,B which has maintained a demographic surveillance system (DSS) in the area 
since  1966.  We  use  a  random  sample  extracted  from  the  database  on  the  Matlab 
Socioeconomic Census (MSEC) 1996, a complete census of the study villages carried 
out by the ICDDR,B. The sample is drawn using the following rule. First, we selected 
a random sample of 2687 baris
21 from a total of 7440 baris in the Matlab thana. These 
2687 baris are the same as those sampled for the Matlab Health and Socio -economic 
Survey (MHSS) 1996, an independent cross-section survey on the Matlab villages
22. 
Then we extracted information on individuals residing in a total of 12015 male -
headed households in the sample baris.  
  The MSEC 1996 sample data does not automatically yield pa st records on 
parental  characteristics  (such  as  age  and  education)  and  outcomes  (such  as 
occupations and asset portfolio). Rather, it is available retrospectively from earlier 
rounds of the MSEC if parents co -resided with their adult children in the same 
household in the past. Using information on relationship to household-head in earlier 
census  records,  one  can  re -construct  parental  work  history  and  other  relevant 
characteristics. To this end, we bring in retrospective (socio -economic) information 
on parents and complete residential history data of current household -heads in the 
following manner. We extract retrospective records on all individuals who shared a 
household in 1982 and/or 1974 with our 1996 sample individuals
23. This led to a total 
                                                 
21 Baris usually consist of a cluster of households in close physical proximity linked in many instances 
in a kin-network.  
22 The MHSS 1996 chose bari as the primary sampling unit (PSU) rather th an households and hence 
provided a better representation of family networks. Conditioning our sampling on the MHSS baris 
also allows us to link our data to the latter. 
23 The ICDDR,B collected census records for the entire Matlab population for the years 1974 and 1982. 39 
 
of 10430 male-headed households (out of in the MSEC 1996 sample for whom we 
had retrospective information implying an attrition rate of 13.2%.  
  It should be noted, however, that the randomness of our working sample due 
to such attrition is not seriously comprised. The characteristics of the included and 
excluded  (N=1585)  households  (due  to  missing  retrospective  data)  are  strikingly 
similar
24. The few noticeable differences are: the heads of the excluded households 
are more educated, more often located in a single -household bari
25 and have less 
cultivable land. However, an additional source of attrition prevails in the presence of 
non-random household division: more able/educated sons split and migrate outside 
the study area. Consequently, household residence (and/or resid ential cluster) based 
sampling akin to our sample may not yield unbiased estimates of economic mobility 
(Rosenzweig, 2003). One can only study mobility on the basis of past records of 
siblings who have continued to reside in the sample area  for 22 years i.e. between 
1974 and 1996. If so, this remains a limitation of our data. 
  For  our  empirical  analysis,  we  construct  two  analytical  samples,  both 
consisting of male household heads
26. The first sample consists of all heads (among 
the 10430 male heads in the MSEC 1996 sample) whose fathers were also present in 
the study area as a head in 1974. As such, we could obtain a random sample of father-
son  pairs  with  complete  information  on  them  and  their  household  characteristics 
permitting a study of intergenerational mobility. A total of 5113 sons are identified in 
the MSEC 1996 for whom their fathers were present as household heads in 1974. The 
remaining 5317 heads (in 1996) were discarded for any of the following four reasons: 
(1) the individual was also a head in 1974 (N= 4048); (2) the individual was not 
                                                 
24 Results are available from the author upon request. 
25 The finding of residence in one-household bari is reassuring in the following sense. These (excluded) 
households are most likely to be recent migrants in the study area so that no informa tion on their 
household of origin is available in the earlier MSEC records. 
26 We focus on heads because data on assets is available only at the household level. 40 
 
present in the household in 1974 so that relation to head could not be ascertained (N= 
263); (3) the individual lived in the study area in 1974 but his household was headed 
by his mother instead (N=165); and (4) the individual was present in a male-headed 
household in 1974 but not related to the head as a son (N=775). These conditions 
were imposed because records on parents were obtained by locating parents as heads 
in the earlier census rounds and subsequently, linking individuals/heads as father and 
son through relation of the individuals to the head of their households in 1996 and 
1974. It should be noted that further attrition in the data due to application of these 
rules does not lead to a loss of randomness of our sample apart from the second rule. 
However, rule 2 leads to a negligible reduction in sample size (i.e. a total of 263 
observations) and hence not a serious concern. There is a further but small loss of 
observations (N=69) due to missing data on wealth for some parents/sons altogether 
resulting in a sample of 5044 sons for whom we have complete contemporaneous data 
on their households and retrospective information on their parents and household of 
origin in childhood. 
The  second  sample  comprises  of  all  adult  sons  in  MSEC  1996  for  whom 
repeated  data  is  available.  This  sample  includes  4048  heads  in  1996  who  also 
remained  heads  in  earlier  years  (i.e.  in  1974  and  1982).  This  sample  permits  an 
analysis of inter-temporal mobility.   
 
b. Identifying the split-offs 
It should be noted that information on whether a household headed by a son is a split-
off is not recorded in the data. It is nevertheless possible to decompose our main 
sample of household heads (5044 sons) on the basis of the history of their households’ 
formation. To this end, we followed Foster (1993) and identified split-offs on the 41 
 
basis of changes in the relationship of individuals to the household-head over time. To 
be specific, we applied 3 rules following Foster (1993):  
i. If the father is present as the head of another household in the study area in 
1996, the son’s household is a split-off.  
ii. If the father is present as a non-head in a household in 1996, that household 
is inherited by the son who heads the household. Any remaining son observed 
to head a household where the father is not residing represents a split-off. 
iii.  If two or more siblings  are present  as  heads  in  1996 and the father is 
absent, the eldest brother has the inherited household and the younger brother 
heads a split-off.  
Application of these rules led to a total of 2425 (47%) split-offs against 2688 (53%) 
inherited households
27. Given that we treat bari as the PSU in this study, our sample 
provides a better representation of the split-offs. This is because, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that sons who do not migrate outside their village of origin in most cases set 
up households in close proximity to father’s household and hence located in the same 
bari.  
c. Creating a wealth index 
Matlab censuses neither contained data on value of the household assets nor was any 
information  available  on  the  stocks  of  assets  reportedly  owned  by  a  household. 
Information on sources of drinking water, quality of housing and various consumer 
durables  nevertheless  exist.  Therefore,  we  constructed  an  aggregate  measure  of 
household wealth by combining data on household assets, quality of dwelling, usage 
and sources of water. The main challenge in creating such an index is the choice of 
appropriate weights. Our preferred method of aggregation is one where weights for 
                                                 
27 This is comparable with Rosenzweig (2003) who, using Bangladeshi panel data, find that the rate of 
household division is 48% over a period of 18 years. 42 
 
each  item  entering  the  household  wealth  index  are  derived  from  an  underlying 
regression that explicitly links total value of household wealth to various assets (see 
Table A1). To be precise, using data on the linked MSEC-MHSS sample households, 
we  regress  total  (log)  value  of  household  assets  on  the  12  variables  additionally 
controlling for household size, schooling of head, and his spouse
28. Data on asset 
value are obtained from the MHSS 1996. (Detailed regression results available from 
the authors upon request). The OLS coefficients on the 12 variables are stored and 
applied respectively as weights to aggregate the indicator variables into a scalar 
quantity, subsequently for various rounds of the MSEC data.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Total value of household assets comprised of current value of the followings items: homestead land, 
ornaments, savings, television, radio, clock, fan, bicycle, furniture and quilt. 